llama0522 hours ago
https://www.pingcap.com/trust-hub/security/security-update-o...
I find it really baffling how much they are downplaying this incident on their statement.
”An external incident response firm reviewed PingCAP’s production systems and found no evidence that the attacker ran commands or maintained persistent access in the systems reviewed”
That does not appear to be true.
bombcaran hour ago
Certainly there was no evidence; they likely have no logging anyway!
zergrushan hour ago
since they pasted customer creds in jira tickets they most likely are very liable hence the downplaying
im not an expert but if I was an investor I'd try to find a buyer for my shares and run
aliasxneo2 hours ago
> PingCAP's engineers paste customers' production credentials into Jira tickets.
Holy hell, I've heard of this happening, but I've never personally seen it in my 10 years as an SRE. That's absolutely wild.
adamparsons2 hours ago
It sounds like their jira instance was truly the keys to the kingdom, given the creds _and_ tickets describing all the flaws needing fixing. A golden README.MD to escalate to their hearts content
xKingfisher21 hours ago
Coming this close on the heels of the security audit by NCC [1] is pretty embarassing for all parties.
[1]https://www.pingcap.com/press-release/tidb-ncc-group-securit...
hintymad9 hours ago
> TiDB, the open-source distributed SQL database powered by PingCAP, today published the results of a rigorous source-code security assessment by NCC Group, one of the world’s leading cybersecurity consultancies.
It looks like you can assess the hell out of your source code, but your system can still leak if you don't secure your operations.
kobieps10 hours ago
From personal experience having worked with multiple "enterprise-grade" pentest vendors (including NCC), I think the entire pentest industry is overdue for a big shake-up.
jacquesm2 hours ago
No particular opinion on NCC but a lot of that stuff is pay-to-play.
neyaan hour ago
Pingcap's statement:
With support from outside counsel and third-party forensic specialists, there is no evidence that data stored in TiDB was impacted. We keep on investigating and will provide updates on any new findings.
dherlsa day ago
If true, this is next level incompetence from PingCap. Apparently the attackers set up a replication pipeline for a month?!
> We even stood up a replication feed of their own control-plane database using credentials committed in their own repositories — GCP service-account keys and an Azure service principal — and let their infrastructure deliver it to us. Every six hours, for the last twenty-two days of the campaign, from 8 September to 30 September, that pipeline faithfully re-exported every table of the operational heart of TiDB Cloud — tenants, users, API keys, cluster credentials, changefeeds, migrations — and pushed it out.
arpinuma day ago
AWS private rates gives PingCAP ~47% off list price. Wonder which services got the biggest discounts? Unsurprisingly for a db company the cross-az traffic is 15% of their bill.
perpetualpear40 minutes ago
You can get some sweet deals on s3, assuming you store 10-100s of PB
gooseaia day ago
[dead]
nemothekida day ago
Man I recently executed a migration from Aurora to Planetscale. I seriously considered PingCap but decided against it because I thought they cloud pricing was too complex. I wonder if my personal information is in the leak.
thenthenthen2 hours ago
Why is Baidu among their clients
wannabe4420 hours ago
> Summary: "The root password of the cluster can be reset unconditionally"
But what matters is that it was all memory safe and had no data races.
boorbat14 hours ago
You realize it's written in Go right?
wannabe4412 hours ago
Not even data race safe then. NGMI.
dangoodmanUTa day ago
what is happening today
and how are people not talking about this more
dilyevsky21 hours ago
only the beginning. next year or two are going to be wild on this front so buckle up...
esafak21 hours ago
rvza day ago
First the Google Cloud outage [0], then the CA private key leak [1]...
...and now this...
> Today we are making the PingCAP breach public. We possess the complete TiDB Cloud control plane, its billing and finance estate, its GCP storage estate and its AWS cost and billing estate, its Jira, its CRM, its analytics, its source code, and a four-year log of every connection every customer ever made to its product, from the IP addresses of their application servers.
This is an entire leak of ALL PingCap TiDB's customers AND data.
All of this in a single day. It is over.
gregwebsa day ago
I am reading this as a leak of every possible piece of metadata but not an actual leak of customer data. They have SQL logs which do contain customer data and there is a mention of some snapshots/imports.
berenddeboer6 hours ago
they leaked full connection strings for customer databases with users and passwords.
hdjdnxjzhzhsa day ago
How the fuck is 10.6TB metadata?
fock11 hours ago
(POV when storing 1PB in Oracle) when I saw the 10 TB in another post, I was like "wait, isn't this sold to scale out, we have 100 times the data here".
gregwebsa day ago
TiDB is for large scale data. You generally wouldn't use it unless you have at least 1TB of data. 10TB is a single small customer database for them.
binsquarea day ago
Easily at scale
Size is not a good indicator for content quality
qingcharlesa day ago
Don't forget the PHP megabomb dropping in a few hours too.
gooseaia day ago
[dead]
jedisct117 hours ago
It's written in Rust, so it's safe.
boorbat14 hours ago
https://github.com/pingcap/tidb reports as 95% Go with no Rust at all?
squirrellous13 hours ago
That confused me too since I remember reading they are Rust proponents. Apparently their storage engine TiKV is written in Rust, and TiDB is the database built on top.